Schrödinger’s IP (IP-NFT Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder) => Proof of Funding Access

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• Proof of Funding Access - Funders gain first-mover advantage through direct access to researchers and early implementation knowledge.
• Contribution Attestation - Cryptographic proofs of contribution provide revealable recognition and reputation benefits.
• Ephemeral Privacy Bond - time decaying bounty to keep research private for a limited time.

Proof of Funding Access addresses Schrödinger's IP problem — the tension between incentivizing innovation through exclusivity and ensuring public access to knowledge — by granting funders early implementation advantages. Through smart contracts, funders secure time-bound, direct access to researchers and research outputs, enabling them to prototype or commercialize discoveries before broader release. This first-mover benefit mirrors the temporary monopolies of patents but avoids centralized enforcement by embedding exclusivity in code rather than law. For example, a decentralized biotech collective might grant early access to funders of a project, allowing them to refine gene-editing tools ahead of public release.

Contribution Attestation resolves the recognition paradox of IP by replacing monetary royalties with verifiable, social capital. Researchers receive immutable, cryptographic proofs of contribution linked to specific milestones. They can either make them public or keep secret, giving ZK proof only when and to the extent necessary. This system aligns with the original intent of IP (recognizing creators) while bypassing profit-driven enclosures, as attribution itself becomes the incentive.

Ephemeral Privacy Bond reconcile exclusivity and access through programmable scarcity. Funders post cryptocurrency bounties that leaks linearly to the contributors of the research, creating a financial incentive to temporarily suppress public release. When amount of posted bounty becomes zero, the results become public. Counter-bonds allow third parties to override suppression earlier. To continue the privacy mode, funders have to pay exponentially larger bounty. This mechanism replicates IP’s temporal exclusivity while democratizing access decisions, as market dynamics — not centralized authorities — determine when knowledge transitions from private asset to public good.

Together, these components forge a self-regulating system where innovation is both rewarded and liberated, resolving Schrödinger’s paradox through decentralized coordination.

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